Journal of Food Law & Policy
Volume 1

Number 1

Article 7

2005

Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and
Feed in the European Union
Margaret Rosso Grossman
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jflp
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, European Law
Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons,
and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Grossman, M. R. (2021). Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed in the
European Union. Journal of Food Law & Policy, 1(1). Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jflp/
vol1/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Journal of Food Law & Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please
contact scholar@uark.edu.

TRACEABILITY AND LABELING OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED CROPS, FOOD, AND FEED IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Margaret Rosso Grossman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last several years, European Union (E.U.) policy has encouraged development of biotechnology, including genetically modified (GM) (that is, bioengineered)' agricultural crops. The E.U.
developed a strategy for life sciences and biotechnology, directed toward improving the competitiveness of the European biotechnology
sector and the general situation for European biotechnology.2 E.U.
documents have acknowledged the potential significance of genetically modified crops-for example, the conclusion in a recent report
that "the potential of plant genomics and biotechnology to deliver major advances in our lifestyles and prosperity is enormous. [Biotechnology] can also maintain and enhance the competitiveness of E.U.
* Margaret Rosso Grossman is Bock Chair and Professor of Agricultural Law at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is an internationally-recognized
expert on issues related to agricultural law and the environment. Dr. Grossman is a
past president of the American Agricultural Law Association and winner of the 1993
AALA Distinguished Service Award, as well as the 1999 Silver Medal of the European
Council for Agricultural Law. She is a three-time Fulbright Research Fellow and has
enjoyed a long-standing relationship with agrarian lawyers at Wageningen University
in The Netherlands. Professor Grossman earned her Ph.D. (musicology) and her
J.D., summa cum laude, from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
This article is based on work supported by the Cooperative State Research,
Education and Extension Service, US Department of Agriculture, under Project No.
ILLU-470-309. The author thanks Matthew T. Grady, J.D. 2004, UIUC, for his
research assistance.
1. Regulatory measures refer to GM crops, though the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prefers the more accurate term "bioengineered." Mark Mansour
& Sarah Key, From Farm to Fork: The Impact on Global Commerce of the New European Union
Biotechnology Regulatory Scheme, 38 INT'L LAW. 55, 65 (2004).
2. See generally Life Sciences and Biotechnology-A Strategy for Europe: Second
Progress Report and Future Orientations, COM(2004)250 final.
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farmers and food producers."3 Nonetheless, producers and consumers in the E.U. have been reluctant to grow GM crops or to consume
GM foods, 4 and scientists disagree about the risks and net benefits of
GM crops and food products. European Community (E.C.) legislators
enacted new regulatory measures only after long deliberation, and
some Member States continue to object to the use of GM crops and
foods in their territories.
Under the new regulatory measures, the E.C. has started to approve GM products. In July 2004, the European Commission approved the import and processing of Monsanto's GM maize, NK603,
for use in animal feed and for industrial purposes, but not for cultivation or for food. 5 The maize was approved for ten years under stringent new regulations. A scientific risk assessment ensured that it
poses no danger to the environment, and an assessment by the European Food Safety Authority concluded that it is as safe as non-GM
corn. 6 When sold, the corn must be labeled clearly as genetically

modified, and its unique identifier will ensure that it can be traced
through the process of post-market monitoring. 7 In October 2004,
the Commission authorized the placing on the market of food and
food ingredients derived from the same NK603 maize.8 Monsanto
had submitted its initial request to place NK603 on the market in
April 2001, and the regulatory process for authorization of food and
feed uses had lasted three and one-half years.9
3.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PLANTS FOR THE FuTURE-2025: A EUROPEAN VISION

FOR PLANT GENOMICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 19

4.

(2004).

In 2002, only about 25,000 hectares of GM crops were sown, mostly in Spain.

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, STA-

2003 at 4.23 (Feb. 2004).
5. Commission Decision 2004/643, 2004 OJ. (L 295) 35. Art. 5 indicates that the
Decision does not apply until NK603 has also been approved for food.
6. European Food Safety Authority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 E.F.S.A. J. 10, 1-13, available at http://www.efsa.eu.
int/science/gino/gmo-opinions/176/opiniongmo 03_final enl.pdf.
7. See Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the placing on the market, in
accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the CounTISTICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION

cil, of a maize product (Zea mays L. line NK 603) genetically modified for glyphosate

tolerance, COM(2004)193 final.
8. Press Release, European Commission, Genetically modified NK603 maize
authorised for both food and feed (IP/04/1305, Oct. 26, 2004). The authorizations
do not allow cultivation in the E.U.
9. Proposal for a Council Decision authorizing the placing on the market of
foods and food ingredients derived from genetically modified maize line NK 603 as
novel foods or novel food ingredients under Regulation (EC) No 258/97, COM
(2004)439 final, at 2.
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Similarly, in May 2004, the Commission authorized the placing
on the market of a GM sweet corn, Syngenta's Btll.' 0 This corn was
authorized for import in 1998, and the recent authorization applies to
canned corn. The corn will be labeled as genetically modified, can be
traced by its unique identifier, and will be entered in the Community
Register of Genetically Modified Food and Feed. 1' With these approvals, eighteen GM foods and nine GM feeds have been approved for
sale in the European Union since 1996.
Approvals of GM crops for cultivation in the E.U. have progressed
more slowly. For the first time, in September 2004, the Commission
listed genetically modified seeds in the E.U. Common Catalogue of
Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species. 12 The seventeen varieties were
derived from Monsanto's MON 810 maize, authorized in 1998. Listing in the Common Catalogue allows the maize to be sold and planted
13
in all Member States.
The approval of NK603 corn signaled the end of a de facto moratorium on approvals of GM crops for import since 1998. To some
extent, the de facto moratorium was the result of a perception that
regulatory measures were inadequate to govern GM crops, food, and
feed. In 2001, after a lengthy regulatory process, the E.C. began to
enact new measures to ensure that GMOs are regulated during the
experimental stage, when they are placed on the market, and afterwards; that those products can be identified and traced through their
life cycle; and that labeling will provide adequate information and
consumer choice.
The most important measures directed specifically toward GMOs
are
U
Directive 90/219 on the contained use of genetically modified microorganisms, as amended.'"
10. Commission Decision 2004/657, 2004 O.J. (L 300) 48.
11. See Proposal for a Council Decision authorising the placing on the market of
sweet corn from genetically modified maize line Btl 1 as a novel food or novel food
ingredients under Regulation (EC) no 258/97, COM(2004)10 final; Press Release,
European Commission, Commission authorises import of canned GM-sweet corn
under new strict labelling conditions-consumers can choose (IP/04/663, May 19,
2004).
12. The Common Catalog is governed by Council Directive 2002/53, 2002 O.J. (L
193) 1, as amended.
13. Press Release, European Commission, Inscription of MON 810 GM maize varieties in the Common EU Catalogue of Varieties (IP/04/1083, Sept. 8, 2004).
14. Council Directive 90/219, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1, as amended; consolidated text
at CONSLEG 1990L0219-20/11/2003.

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW

*

*
*

& POLICY

[VOL. 1:43

Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into the environment of
genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/
220, as amended. 1 5
16
Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed.
Regulation 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of
genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed
products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18.17

The last two measures replace several Regulations (1139/98,18 49/2 1
2000,19 and 50/200020), as well as the Novel Foods Regulation,
which had governed pre-market authorization and labeling for GM
foods, insofar as it applied to GMOs.
The Commission has proposed a Decision to establish minimum
thresholds for adventitious or technically unavoidable traces of GM
seeds in other products, 22 but at a September 2004 meeting, the measure was not agreed. The Food Law, Regulation 178/2002,23 sets out
general principles and establishes the European Food Safety Authority. In addition, the Environmental Liability Directive applies to allocate responsibility for some types of damage for contained use,
24
deliberate release, transport, or placing on the market of GMOs.
Other measures, mentioned below, also apply.
A.

Lawmaking in the E.C.

The European Union, now twenty-five Member States, is governed by primary legislation-its founding Treaties, as amendedand by secondary legislation.
15.

Parliament and Council Directive, 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1, as amended; consoli-

dated text at CONSLEG 2001L0018-07/11/2003.
16. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 1.
17. Parliament and Council Regulation 2001/18, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24.
18. Council Regulation 1139/98, 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4 (labeling of food produced
from GMOs).
19. Commission Regulation 49/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 13 (amending Regulation
1139/98).
20. Commission Regulation 50/2000, 2000 OJ. (L 6) 15 (labeling for GM additives and flavorings).
21. Parliament and Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 OJ. (L 43) 1. Parts of the
Regulation remain in effect.
22. Draft Commission Decision establishing minimum thresholds for adventitious
or technically unavoidable traces of genetically modified seeds in other products,
http://www.genfood.at/download/com-draftseeds-04_2004.pdf.
23. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 OJ. (L 31) 1.
24. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 OJ. (L 143) 56.
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Primary Legislation: The Treaties

The Treaties establish the E.C. and many of its institutions, authorize Community activities, and prescribe procedures for decision
making. The Treaty of Rome (1958) established the European Economic Community (EEC); the Treaty on European Union (1993)
changed the name of the EEC to European Community (EC) and added new cooperation. The Single European Act (1987) helped complete the single market and added the environment title. The
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) made further amendments and renumbered the Treaty, and the Treaty of Nice (2003) streamlined proce25
dures for new Member States.
In June 2004, E.U. leaders agreed on the text of a new Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. 26 After translation into all official languages, the Constitution was signed by Heads of State and Government of the Member States in Rome, in October 2004. All twentyfive Member States must ratify the Constitution, using their own constitutional procedures, before it can enter into force. If the ratification procedure is successful, the Constitution will enter into force in
November 2006.27 The Constitution will create one Union, which will
replace the European Communities and European Union, and the
Constitution will govern the Union, replacing the E.U. and E.C.
28
Treaties.
2.

Secondary Legislation: Types of Measures

The Treaty entrusts enactment of secondary legislation to the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, to the Council, and
to the Commission. The E.C. enacts secondary legislation under authority of the Treaty, and measures normally identify the source of
25. The various Treaties are available at European Commission, Treaties, http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search treaties.html.
26. TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 1 (2004) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
27. European Union, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/referendum-en.htm (last visited June 13, 2005). The Heads of
State of three candidate countries, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, also signed. In
Spring 2005, however, both France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in
national referenda, raising doubts about its success. See, e.g., Ed Johnson, Britain Sets
Aside Vote on EU ConstitutionAfter Defeats in France,Netherlands, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/2005
0606-1638-britain-euconstitution.html.
28. European Union, Summary of the Agreement on the Constitutional Treaty (June 28,
2004) (a non-paper to provide information on the Treaty), at http://europa.eu.int/
futurum (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
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authority. Measures that govern GMOs and GM food and feed invoke
Treaty authority to regulate in the areas of agriculture, the environment, and public health, 29 as well as authority for the approximation
(or harmonization) of Member State laws that affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. 30
GMOs are governed by several different types of secondary legislation. Most important are regulations and directives. "A regulation
shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States. '3 1 Because regulations apply
directly, most need not be transposed into Member State law. Regulations that govern GMOs, however, require cooperation of Member
States in the authorization process. "A directive shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods. ''3 2 Directives are normally effective after implementation in Member State law, usually by a deadline established in the directive. The Commission may seek enforcement against Member
States that fail to enact implementing provisions. 33
Other measures include decisions, recommendations, and opinions. Decisions may be addressed to Member States or private parties,
and "a decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it
is addressed." 34 "Recommendations and opinions shall have no bind'3 5
ing force.
3.

Enacting Secondary Legislation

The Treaty prescribes several methods for enacting directives and
regulations. Most important is the co-decision procedure, 36 a lengthy
process that requires agreement of both the European Parliament
and the Council. Most recent measures that govern GMOs have been
enacted under this procedure. In addition, the Commission or the
Council often issues detailed rules to implement measures enacted by
Parliament and Council.
29. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
(1997) [hereinafter E.C. TRAT].

30.
31.
32.
33.

COMMUNITY,

Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3

Id. art. 95.
Id. art. 249.
Id.
Id. art. 226; see, e.g., Case C-296/01, Commission v. French Rep., 2003 E.C.R. I-

0000 (finding that France failed to transpose Directive 90/220, the original measure
that governed deliberate release of GMOs).
34. E.C. TREATY art. 249.

35. Id.
36. Id. art. 251.
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Case Law

The European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance37 ensure that "in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law
is observed." 38 The Commission, national courts, and individuals may
refer matters to the courts. The Treaty establishes the jurisdiction of
each court.
B.

EnvironmentalPrinciples

The Treaty of Rome did not provide Community competence for
environmental matters or even mention the word "environment."
Nonetheless, beginning in 1973, the Commission published a series of
Environmental Action Programs, and the Council enacted environmental legislation under authority of more general Treaty articles. In
1987, the Single European Act added a title on the environment and
provided a clear legal basis for enacting environmental measures. 39
1. Principles
The environmental title of the Treaty, as amended, indicates that
community environmental policy should "aim at a high level of protection" and should be based on "the precautionary principle and on
the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the
polluter should pay."40 The integration principle encourages environmental protection by prescribing that environmental protection must
be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies and activities. 41 These principles help to guide E.C.
regulation of GMOs; among them, the precautionary principle has received most attention.

37. Id. arts. 220-245.
38. Id. art. 220.
39. For detail on E.C. environmental authority, see Margaret Rosso Grossman,
Agro-Environmental Measures in the Common Agricultural Policy, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 927,
937-53 (1995).
40. E.C. TREATY art. 174(2); CONSTITUTION art. 111-233(2) also includes these
principles.
41. E.C. TREATY art. 6; CONSTITUTION art. 11-97.
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2.

Precautionary Principle
a)

In General

Evolving, perhaps, from the German Vorsorgeprinzip,42 the precautionary principle (or precautionary approach) has become part of international law, particularly for measures that protect the
environment. For example, The Rio Declaration invokes the principle: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost43
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.1

Similarly, the Convention on Biological Diversity advocates the
precautionary approach, noting that "lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures" to minimize
loss of biological diversity. 44 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to
the Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force in
September 2003 and governs living modified organisms, uses a precautionary approach when importing parties are faced with "[1] ack of
scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of
45
a living modified organism."
Developed in environmental law, the precautionary principle has
also been applied in other fields, including food law and public health
measures. The principle has engendered significant controversy, and
46
it is not uniformly accepted, interpreted, or applied.
In the E.C., the precautionary principle is enshrined, though not
explained, among the environmental principles in the Treaty; under
the integration principle, it should also be incorporated in other E.C.
42.

Vorsorgeprinzip means "principle of precaution."

43.

U.N.

CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,

ENVIRONMENT AND

DEVELOPMENT,

Rio

DECLARATION ON

Principle 15, U.N. Doc. 4/conf.151/26 (vol. I),

U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1992).
44. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, pmbl., June 5, 1992, available at http://
www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp?g=0&a-cbd-00.
45. Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 11(8) (2000), 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf. For more information

on the precautionary principle, see LUCAS
THE NEW ECONOMY

BERGKAMP, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW FOR

157-214 (2003); NICOLAS

DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL

PRINCI-

91-223 (2002).
46. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 151 U. PENN. L. REV.
1003, 1004 ("I aim to challenge the precautionary principle ... because, read for all
that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all.").
PLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES
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policies.4 7 The Communication from the Commission on the precautionary
principle48 provides explanation and guidelines for application. The
Commission notes:
Although the precautionary principle is not explicitly mentioned in
the Treaty except in the environmental field, its scope is far wider
and covers those specific circumstances where scientific evidence is
insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications
through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are
reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be
49
inconsistent with the chosen level of protection.
The principle is used to manage risk, and its use is triggered by unacceptable risk and scientific uncertainty. Measures based on the principle must be proportional, non-discriminatory, consistent with similar
measures, based on analysis of costs and benefits, subject to review in
light of new scientific data (that is, temporary), and assign responsibil50
ity for producing scientific data.
The Council endorsed the broad lines of this Communication
and, among other recommendations, called on the Commission to incorporate the principle in legislative proposals and other actions,
where appropriate. 51 A European Parliament resolution raised issues
about application of the principle.5 2 Parliament noted that the precautionary principle is only one of several tools for risk management
and should be "part of an overall policy based on other factors such
'53
as, for instance, traceability or labelling.
b)

GMOs and the Precautionary Principle

Because biotechnology is perceived to pose uncertain risks to
health and the environment, GMOs have invited application of the
precautionary principle. The principle has influenced the regulation
47. DE SADELEER, supra note 45, at 110. For a Court of First Instance decision applying the principle, see Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, 2002
E.C.R. 11-3305.
48. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle,
COM(2000)1 final.
49. Id. at 9-10.
50. Id. at 16-20.
51. Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle,
1, 24, Annex III to European Council, Nice, Conclusions of the Presidency (Dec. 2000), http://www.
europarl.eu.int/summits/nice2_en.htm.
52. European Parliament Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, 2001 O.J. (C
232) 345.
53. Id. at 347.
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of GMOs in the E.C., and much commentary has focused on its appli54
cation to the management of risk from GMOs.
Early E.C. legislation that governed GMOs used a precautionary
approach, but without referring directly to the precautionary principle. For example, Directive 90/220 did not cite the principle, though
it did invoke the related principle that preventive action should be
taken. 5 5 Nonetheless, the precautionary approach played a role in implementation of this and other measures, and it was one basis for the
de facto moratorium on authorizations of GM varieties that began in
October 1998.56
Directive 2001/18 again mentions the prevention principle and
directly invokes the precautionary principle: "The precautionary principle has been taken into account in the drafting of this Directive and
must be taken into account when implementing it."5 7 In addition,
"Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle,
ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects
on human health and the environment which might arise from the
deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs. ''5 8 Various
provisions of Directive 2001/18, especially for risk assessment and
post-approval monitoring, implement the principle.
The 2002 Food Law, which lays down general principles and requirements for food safety, devotes an article to the precautionary
principle:
In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk
management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk
59
assessment.
Measures enacted should be "proportionate and no more restrictive
of trade than is required ....
[with] regard being had to technical
''60
and economic feasibility and other factors.
54. E.g., Zeynep Kivilcim Forsman, Community Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: A Difficult Relationship Between Law and Science, 10 EUR. L.J. 580 (2004).
55. Council Directive 90/220, pmbl., 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15, 15.
56. See Silvia Francescon, The New Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release of
Genetically Modified Organisms into the Environment: Changes and Perspectives, 10 REv. EUR.
CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 309, 311 (2001).
57. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (8), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 1.
58. Directive 2001/18, art. 4(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 5.
59. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 7(1), 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, 9.
60. Regulation 178/2002, art. 7(2), 2002 O.J. (L 31) at 9.
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The 2003 regulation on traceability and labeling, refers to "risk
management measures in accordance with the precautionary principle." 61 The accompanying GM food and feed Regulation refers in62
stead to a "high level of protection of human life and health."
II.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATORY MEASURES

European Community regulation of GMOs and GM food and
feed relies on a number of interrelated Directives and Regulations. 63
These have been enacted and revised over the past fifteen years, 64 and
the regulatory system is not yet complete. The system for authorizing
the use of GMOs is process based, rather than product based. It requires case-by-case authorization of GMOs and follows a step-by-step

process of decreasing containment. Traceability and labeling, with
thresholds for their applicability, are important components of the
most recent E.C. regulation.
Because the focus of these materials is new E.C. measures that
govern food and feed and require traceability and labeling, provisions
for authorization of GMOs under older measures are treated only

briefly, despite the detailed regulatory scheme.
A.

Contained Use-Directive 90/219, as Amended

Directive 90/219, which continues in force, sets out measures for
the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs).
Contained use refers to activities in which micro-organisms are genetically modified or in which the GMMs are used in any way, and for

which "specific containment measures are used to limit their contact
with, and to provide a high level of safety for, the general population
and the environment. '65 The Directive thus governs research, work in
61. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, pmbl. (3), 2003 OJ. (L 268)
24, 24.
62. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) 1,

1.
63. The most important measures are listed in the Introduction, supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
64. Measures enacted in 1990 governed the contained use of genetically modified
micro-organisms (Council Directive 90/219, 1990 OJ. (L 117) 1) and the deliberate
release of genetically modified organisms into the environment (Council Directive
90/220, 1990 OJ. (L 117) 15). Council Directive 90/220 was repealed, effective October 17, 2002, when Directive 2001/18 took effect. Council Directive 90/219, as
amended, continues in force.
65. Parliament and Council Directive 90/219, art. 2(c), 1990 OJ. (L 117) 1, as
amended; consolidated text at CONSLEG 1990L0219 - 20/11/2003.
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laboratories, and industrial work with GMMs. Member States assume
responsibility for many aspects of implementation.
Member States designate a competent authority to assume responsibility for implementing the Directive, including inspections and
other control measures. Member States must avoid adverse effects on
health and environment from contained uses of GMMs. Therefore,
users are to carry out risk assessments to determine the class of risk
(negligible, low, moderate, or high risk) and the resulting assignment
of containment level. 66 Moderate or high risk contained use of GMMs
requires prior written consent of the competent authority. 67 Users
have responsibility to apply the containment and other protective
measures that apply to each class of contained use and to notify Member State authorities of activities carried out on their premises. 68
Member States must report to the Commission when accidents occur
and annually (with a summary every three years). They must also notify other States of relevant incidents (e.g., accidents).
Annexes to the Directive describe criteria to be met when establishing safety of GMMs for human health and the environment (Annex II); principles to be applied in the risk assessment (Annex III);
measures required for various types of containment-laboratories,
growing rooms, animal units, other activities (Annex IV); and information required for notifications required by the Directive (Annex
V).69

B.
1.

Deliberate Release

In General

The E.C. enacted Directive 2001/18 after a decade of experience
with its predecessor, Council Directive 90/22070 and a Commission
review of its effectiveness. 71 The new Deliberate Release Directive was
intended to make the decision making process for authorizing GMOs
more efficient and transparent and to control risks that might
66.

Directive 90/219, arts. 5, 6, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 4, 5.

67. Directive 90/219, art. 10, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 6.
68. Directive 90/219, arts. 7-12, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 5, 6-7.
69. For more detail on Directives 90/219 and 90/220, see Margaret Rosso Grossman & A. Bryan Endres, Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European
Union, 44 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScL 378, 393-403 (2000).
70. Council Directive 90/220, 1.990 OJ. (L 117) 15, as amended (no longer in

force).
71. Report of the Commission on the Review of Council Directive 90/220/EEC,
cited in Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (1), 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1.
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threaten human health and the environment. 72 It imposed more
stringent measures for environmental risk assessment, added a postmarket monitoring requirement, limited the authorization for release
of GMOs to ten years, and required Member States to ensure traceability and labeling of GMOs at all stages of placing on the market.
A number of other regulatory measures supplement Directive
2001/18 with detailed guidance notes (e.g., Council Decision 2002/
811, 7 3 Commission Decision 2002/62374), format instructions for sub7
mitting information (e.g., Council Decisions 2002/812, 2002/813; 5
Commission Decision 2003/70176), and arrangements for GMO registers (e.g., Commission Decision 2004/20477). Member States were to
have implemented Directive 2001/18 in their national laws by 17 October 2002. Not all States have done so. As of August 2004, seven of
the fifteen Member States and eight of the ten new States had communicated implementation measures. The Commission filed legal actions against eight of the fifteen Member States for failure to enact
78
national measures.
Under the Directive, a genetically modified organism is "an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic
material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by
mating and/or natural recombination. ''79 General provisions in the
Directive-e.g., environmental risk assessment, confidentiality, consultation requirements-apply to all GMOs.
Anyone who plans to seek authorization for release of a GMO
must carry out an environmental risk assessment.8 0 The Directive
identifies the types of information that might be needed to carry out
72. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (5), (48), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 3. See also Estelle Brosset, The PriorAuthorisation ProcedureAdopted for the DeliberateRelease into the Environment
of Genetically Modified Organisms: the Complexities of Balancing Community and National
Competences, 10 EUR. LJ. 555 (2004).
73. Council Decision 2002/811, 2002 OJ. (L 280) 27.
74. Commission Decision 2002/623, 2002 OJ. (L 200) 22.
75. Council Decision 2002/812, 2002 OJ. (L 280) 37; Council Decision 2002/813,
2002 OJ. (L 280) 62.
76. Commission Decision 2003/701, 2003 OJ. (L 254) 21.
77. Commission Decision 2004/204, 2004 OJ. (L 65) 20.
78. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the experience of member states with GMOs placed on the market under Directive
2001/18/EC and incorporating a specific report on the operation of parts B and C of
the Directive, COM(2004)575 final at 4. This document is a report on Member State
experience under Directive 2001/18.
79. Directive 2001/18, art. 2(2), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 4.
80. Directive 2000/18, art. 6, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 6.
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the risk assessment for higher plants and for other organisms.8 1 Potential adverse effects of the release on human health and the environment, especially from gene transfer, must be assessed on a case-by8 2
case basis. The Directive establishes "principles" for risk assessment,
8 3
and the Commission provided more specific guidance.
Directive 2001/18 governs deliberate release of GMOs in two circumstances: "any other purpose than for placing on the market" (in
Part B) and "placing on the market of GMOs as or in products" (in
Part C). These two circumstances are discussed separately.
2.

Non-Market Deliberate Releases

Directive 2001/18 implements a step-by-step principle. That is,
"the containment of GMOs is reduced and the scale of release increased gradually, step by step, but only if evaluation of the earlier
steps in terms of protection of human health and the environment
indicates that the next step can be taken."8 4 GMOs cannot be placed
on the market until they have been field tested in appropriate ecosystems; therefore deliberate release at the research stage is one of the
85
steps towards marketing.
Member States, through their competent authorities, play the
main role in authorizing non-market deliberate releases, e.g., releases
for field testing or other research. The Directive governs the procedure to be followed and the time frames for the various steps in the
process.
A notification to the Member State competent authority is required before a deliberate release of a GMO or combination of
GMOs. The notification requires a technical dossier, including detailed information prescribed in Annex l11,86 and the environmental
risk assessment.8 7 A summary of each notification must be sent to the
Commission, which forwards the summary to other Member States,
81.

Directive 2000/18, Annex III, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 23-31.
82. Directive 2000/18, Annex iI, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 19-22.
83. Commission Decision 2002/623, 2002 OJ. (L 200) 22. Applicants should determine risk by evaluating possible adverse effects, their likelihood, and the magnitude of the consequences, and by identifying management strategies available to
reduce risks.
84. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (24), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 2.
85. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (23), (25); 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 2.
86. See also Council Decision 2002/813, art. 1, 2002 OJ. (L 280) 62, 62 (establishing the particular summary notification format that must be used in connection with
a non-market deliberate release).
87. Directive 2001/18, art. 6, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 6.
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who may "present observations."18 If appropriate, Member States may
consult the public on a proposed release.8 9 The competent authority
must give written consent to the release or, if the proposed release
does not comply with the Directive, reject the notification.
No release is permitted until the notifier has received written
consent from the competent authority. After the release, the notifier
must report results, especially concerning risk to health or the environment, to the competent authority.90 Member States must make
available to the public information on all releases in their territory,
but without disclosing confidential information. 9 1 Commission Decision 2004/204 sets forth detailed guidance for Member States to fol92
low in developing publicly accessible registers.
C.

Placing on the Market

Placing products on the market affects the entire Community.
Once a written consent for a GMO has been issued, that GMO may be
93
used "without further notification throughout the community."
Member States may not "prohibit, restrict or impede the placing on
the market of GMOs, as or in products," if the GMOs have been authorized. 94 Therefore the procedures for placing GMOs on the market are more complicated and require more involvement of the
Commission and the competent authorities of all Member States.
Directive 2001/18 makes clear that placing on the market also
covers imports. That is, products containing or consisting of GMOs
cannot be imported into the E.C. if they do not comply with E.C.
requirements. 95
Directive 2001/18 governs the placing on the market of GMOs,
and Regulation 1829/2003 governs GM food and feed. Under the
latter, the "one door-one key principle" applies; that is, a single au88. Directive 2001/18, art. 11, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 8.
89. Directive 2001/18, art. 9(1), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 8.
90. Directive 2001/18, art. 10, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 8; see also Decision 2003/701,
2003 O.J. (L 254) 21 (providing the format for reporting results of a non-market

deliberate release).
91. Directive 2001/18, arts. 9(2), 25, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 8, 14.
92. Commission Decision 2004/204, 2004 O.J. (L 65) 20. To protect commercial
interests, two sets of data should be maintained, one accessible to the public and the
other accessible only to Member States, the Commission, and EFSA.
93. Directive 2001/18, art. 19(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12.
94. Directive 2001/18, art. 22, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13. Article 22 applies without
prejudice to the safeguard clause, Article 23.
95. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (11), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 1.
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thorization can cover the deliberate release of a GMO and its use as
96
food or feed.
1.

GMOs-Directive 2001/18

The authorization procedure for GMOs to be placed on the market under Directive 2001/18 begins with notification to the Member
State competent authority. That notification must include information about the GMO, the environmental risk assessment, a plan for
post-release monitoring, conditions for use and handling of the product, a summary of the dossier, and other information. 97 The summary
dossier must be prepared according to the format prescribed by the
Council. Required information includes the nature of the GMO and
its predicted behavior, plus information about previous releases and
the monitoring plan. 98
The post-release monitoring plan is an important component of
the notification. The Directive describes its contents in general
terms, 99 and guidance notes provide additional details. 10 0 The objective of the monitoring plan for a GMO is to ensure that the assumptions underlying the environmental risk assessment are correct and to
identify unanticipated adverse effects on human health or the environment.1 0 1 In light of the unique characteristics of each GMO, mon10 2
itoring plans must be developed on a case-by-case basis.
The Member State competent authority must examine each notification for compliance with the Directive, then prepare an assessment report. The report should focus particularly on the proposed
use, the environmental risk assessment, and the proposed post-release
monitoring plan.10 3 A competent authority may decide that a GMO
should not be placed on the market and reject the notification. If the
competent authority concludes that the GMO should be placed on
the market, the authority must send the dossier summary, along with
its assessment report on the proposed GMO, to the Commission and
to the competent authorities of the other Member States. 10 4 The
96. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 0.J. (L 268) 1.
97. Directive 2001/18, art. 13(2), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 9.
98. Council Decision 2002/812, Annex, 2002 0J. (L 280) 37, 38.
99. Directive 2001/18, Annex VII, 2002 0J. (L 106) at 36.
100. Council Decision 2002/811, Annex, 2002 0J. (L 280) 27, 27-36.
101. Decision 2002/811, Annex, 2002 OJ. (L 280) at 29.
102. Decision 2002/811, Annex, 2002 0J. (L 280) at 28.
103. Directive 2001/18, Annex VI, 2001 0J. (L 106) at 35.
104. Directive 2001/18, art. 4, 2001 0J. (L 106) at 9-10. If the competent authority
concludes that the GMO should not be placed on the market, the procedure differs
slightly. See Directive 2001/18, art. 15, 2001 0.J. (L 106) at 10.
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Commission must make the dossier summary and assessment report
10 5
available to the public for comment.
The Commission and other Member States have the opportunity
to ask for information, make comments, or "present reasoned objections" to the placing of a GMO on the market. 10 6 If no objections are
made, or if outstanding issues are resolved, the competent authority
that assessed the GMO may give written consent to the notifier and
also inform the Commission and the other Member States. 10 7 Indeed,
in a case brought under Directive 90/220, the European Court ofJustice held that when no objections are raised, the competent authority
108
is obliged to give consent.
Written consent will be explicit and will include specific conditions for use, handling and packaging of the GMO or for protection
of the environment, labeling requirements ("This product contains
genetically modified organisms."), and obligations for monitoring. 10 9
After consent, notifiers must follow the prescribed monitoring plan
and report regularly to the Commission and competent authorities;
results of monitoring are also available to the public.11 0 Written consent shall be given for a maximum of ten years, and the Directive
prescribes a procedure for renewal.1 11
The standard procedure described above applies unless the Commission or a Member State raises and maintains an objection to consent. In most cases under prior law (that is Directive 90/220),
objections have been raised. 1 2 Under Directive 2001/18, when objections are raised, the Commission must consult the competent Scientific Committee, the Scientific Panel on GMOs of the European Food
Safety Authority.' 13 If the scientific decision is favorable, the Commission will follow the Community inter-agency regulatory procedure to
reach a decision. 1 1 4 The Commission submits a draft of the measure
to be taken (i.e., a legislative decision to give consent to a proposed
GMO) to a regulatory committee, made up of Member State repre105. Directive 2001/18, art. 24(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 14.
106. Directive 2001/18, art. 15(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 10.
107. See Directive 2001/18, art. 15(3), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 10.
108. Case C-6/99, Association Greenpeace France v. Minist~re de l'Agriculture et
de la Pfche, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1651. See Francescon, supra note 56, at 312.
109. Directive 2001/18, art. 19(3), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12.
110. Directive 2001/18, art. 20, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12-13.
111. Directive 2001/18, arts. 15(4), 17, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 10-11.
112. See Brosset, supra note 72, at 568-71 (outlining Member State failures to
cooperate).
113. Directive 2001/18, art. 28, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 14-15.
114. Directive 2001/18, arts. 18, 30(2), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12, 15. That procedure
is set out in Council Decision 1999/468, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 25.
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sentatives. If that committee agrees, the Commission will grant consent. If not, the Commission submits the measure to the Council (and
informs Parliament). If the Council does not agree or oppose the
consent by a qualified majority, the Commission may grant consent.
Under this procedure, for example, the Commission granted consent
115
for placing Maize NK603 on the market.
Even after consent is granted, a safeguard clause protects Member States. 1 16 A Member State may provisionally restrict or prohibit
use or sale of a GMO as or in a product on its territory under limited
conditions. The Member State must have detailed grounds for considering that the GMO poses a risk to human health or the environment, on the basis of either information made available since the date
of consent or a reassessment of existing information using new scientific information. 1 7 The Member State must inform the Commission
and other Member States, including its review of environmental risk
and other information. The Commission, with assistance of the Scientific Committee, must decide whether the Member State's action is
justified. A number of Member States have invoked the safeguard
clause in attempted bans of GMOs.1 18 In July 2004, for example, the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published opinions of the
Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms that found no
new scientific evidence that would justify prohibition of certain GM
crops in Greece or Austria. 119
The Treaty offers an additional general safeguard. Article 95(5)
permits Member States to introduce national provisions after adoption of a Council or Commission harmonization measure, "based on
115. Commission Decision 2004/643, 2004 OJ. (L 295) 35.
116. Directive 2001/18, art. 23, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13.
117. Directive 2001/18, art. 23, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13.
118. Six Member States invoked the safeguard clause, art. 16, of Directive 90/220,
in nine applications. In each instance, no justification for the state ban was found.
European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the European
Union, at 8 & Annex 5 (Nov. 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/bi-

otechology/gmfood/qanda-en.pdf. For a list of Member State invocations of the
safeguard clause, see Invocation of Article 16 under Directive 90/220/EC and Article
23 under Directive 2001/18/EC (Safeguard clause) as of 15 March 2005, http://eu-

ropa.eu.int/comm/environment/biotechnology/safeguardcClauses.htm.
119. European Food Safety Authority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on a request from the Commission related to the Austrian
invoke of Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC, 2004 E.F.S.A. J. 78, 1-13, http://www.
efsa.eu.int/science/gmo/gmo-opinions/507_en.html; European Food Safety Authority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on a re-

quest from the Commission related to the Greek invoke of Article 23 of Directive
2001/18/EC,

2004

E.F.S.A.

gmo-opinions/506_en.html.

J. 79, 1-8, http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/gmo/
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new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment
...

on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising

after the adoption of the harmonisation measure." 120 The Member
State must notify the Commission of the proposed provisions and the
grounds for enacting them; the Commission must ascertain whether
the provisions discriminate or restrict trade and whether they interfere with the internal market.1 21 Relying on this Treaty provision,
Austria proposed a ban on the use of GMOs in Upper Austria, justifying its measure as a means to protect traditional and organic production systems, nature, the environment, and biodiversity. 122 Austria's
proposed measure, a ban on GMOs, was more restrictive than the
case-by-case authorization procedure prescribed in Directive 2001/
18.123 To evaluate the scientific justification for the proposed Austrian ban, the Commission asked the advice of EFSA, which consulted
the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms. EFSA concluded that Austria's justification did not meet the requirements of
Treaty Article 95(5),124 and the Commission therefore rejected Aus125
tria's proposed national provisions.
2.

Food and Feed-Regulation 1829/2003
a)

In General

Regulation 1829/2003 on GM food and feed is designed to ensure a high level of protection of human and animal health and to set
out provisions for authorizing, supervising, and labeling GM food and
feed. 126 The Regulation relies on the new principles articulated in
Directive 2001/18 and uses the framework for risk assessment established in the 2002 Food Law, Regulation 178/2002.127
120.

EC TREATY art. 95(5). Article 95(4) includes an analogous provision for ex-

isting Member State measures.
121. EC TREATY art. 95(5) (6).
122. Commission Decision 2003/653, 2003 OJ. (L 230) at 36. The difficulties
posed by coexistence of organic and GM crops concerned Austria.
123. Decision 2003/653, 2003 oJ. (L 230) at 34, 39. Moreover, Directive 2001/18
permitted widespread circulation of approved GMOs whereas Austria sought to prohibit circulation of an approved GMO.
124. Decision 2003/653, 2003 OJ. (L 230) at 42. Austria did not provide new scientific evidence related to protection of the environment, prove that its concerns about
the coexistence of organic and GM crops were environmental, or show that Upper
Austria had unique ecosystems.
125. Decision 2003/653, 2003 OJ. (L 230) at 43.
126. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 1-2.
127. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (9), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 2. See also Parliament
and Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 OJ. (L 31) 1.
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EFSA administers Regulation 1829/2003, carrying out responsibilities similar to those of the Commission under the Deliberate Release Directive. EFSA assesses the risks of GM food or feed, albeit with
assistance from Member State agencies. 128 The Food Law makes the
Scientific Committee and permanent Scientific Panels of independent
scientific experts responsible for providing scientific opinions of the
EFSA. 129 A Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, estab130
lished in the Food Law, plays a key role.
Under the one door-one key principle, a single application may
cover a GMO and a food or feed containing or consisting of GMOs.
In that case, the applicant must provide information normally required under Directive 2001/18: the technical dossier, information
and conclusions about the risk assessment, and a monitoring plan for
3
environmental effects.' '
The Regulation sets out separate, but similar, measures for GM
food 13 2 and feed;'3 3 products likely to be used both as food and feed
may be authorized under a single application.13 4 In November 2004,
EFSA published a lengthy guidance document for preparation of risk
35
assessments of GM plants and derived food and feed.1
b)

GM Food
(1)

Scope

Regulation 1829/2003 governs GMOs for food use, food containing or consisting of GMOs, and food produced from or containing
ingredients produced from GMOs.13 6 "Produced from GMOs" means
"derived, in whole or in part, from GMOs, but not containing or consisting of GMOs.'
flavorings as well.

7
38

3

The Regulation governs GM food additives and

128. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 6, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 8-9.
129. Regulation 178/2002, art. 28(1), 2002 OJ. (L 31) at 15.
130. See Regulation 178/2002, art. 28(4) (d), 2002 OJ. (L 31) at 15.
131. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 5(5), 17(5), 2002 O.J. (L 31) at 8, 13.
132. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 3-14, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 6-12.
133. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 15-26, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 12-17.
134. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 27, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 17.
135. See generally European Food Safety Authority, Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for the Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants and Derived Food and Feed, 2004 E.F.S.A. J. 99, 1-94, www.efsa.
eu.int/science/gmo/gmo-guidance/660/gmo-guidance-riskassess-en l.pdf.
136. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 3(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 6.
137. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 2(10), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 6; see also Regulation
1830/2003, art. 3(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 24, 25.
138. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (12), (13), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 2.
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Products that are produced with a GMO but have no GM material
in the end product are excluded from regulation. This includes food
made with GM processing or products from animals fed with GM
feed. 139 GMOs to be used as seeds are governed by other measures
and generally fall outside the scope of the Regulation.1 40 The requirements of Regulation 1829/2003 apply in a "non-discriminatory manner" to Community and imported products,14 1 and the Regulation
purports to take account of commitments to international trade and
1 42
obligations under the Cartagena Protocol.
(2)

Authorization Process

GM food cannot be placed on the market in the E.U. without an
authorization granted under Regulation 1829/2003. An authorized
GM food must not have adverse effects on health or the environment,
mislead the consumer, or differ in a nutritionally adverse way from
the food it replaces. The authorization process is intended to ensure
143
that these requirements are met.
Authorization is similar to the process under Directive 2001/18,
though the EFSA plays a central role under Regulation 1829/2003.
The applicant submits an application, accompanied by scientific studies, a summary dossier, and other information, to the competent authority in a Member State. The Commission, in consultation with
EFSA, has enacted detailed rules to guide the preparation of applications. 144 The national competent authority sends the application to
EFSA, which informs, and forwards the application to, other Member
States and the Commission and makes the summary dossier available
145
to the public.
Authorization involves a scientific evaluation followed by a risk
management decision. 146 EFSA must prepare its opinion on the basis
of scientific analysis and consultation with experts and (for GMOs,
under the one door-one key procedure) with Member State competent authorities. EFSA must forward its opinion, along with an assessment report, to the applicant, the Commission, and the Member
States. The opinion is made public, and comments may be submitted
139. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (16), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2-3. See also Mansour
& Key, supra note 1, at 61.
140. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (34), art. 6(3) (c), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 4, 8.
141. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (43), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 5.
142. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 44, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 21.
143. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 7.
144. See generally Commission Regulation 641/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 102) 14.
145. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 5, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 7-8.
146. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (9), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2.
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to the Commission. The Commission then submits a draft decision
on the authorization to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain
and Animal Health.1 47 The inter-agency regulatory procedure, mentioned above,1 48 is used to reach final decision on the application.
Authorization of GM food is valid throughout the Community for ten
years and can be renewed. 149 Authorized GM foods are listed in the
15 0
Community Register of Genetically Modified Food and Feed.
c)

GM Feed
(1)

Scope

Regulation 1829/2003 also governs GMOs for feed use, feed con5
taining or consisting of GMOs, and feed produced from GMOs.1 1
GM feed cannot be placed on the market, used, or processed in the
E.U. without authorization. 15 2 Authorized GM feed must not have adverse effects on human or animal health or on the environment, mislead consumers, impair "distinctive features of the animal products,"
or differ in a nutritionally adverse way from the feed it is intended to
153
replace.
(2)

Authorization Process

The authorization process is similar to the process used for GM
food, with the initial application, accompanied by scientific studies
and other pertinent information, submitted to the Member State competent authority. That authority informs EFSA, which makes information available to other Member States, the Commission, and the
1 54
public.
An application for authorization will undergo a stringent scientific evaluation, followed by a risk management decision.1 55 EFSA
prepares an opinion, based on scientific evidence and expert consultation, which is sent to the applicant, the Commission, and the Member States; the public has an opportunity to submit comments to the
147. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 7, 35, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 9, 19.
148. Council Decision 1999/468, 1999 O.J. (L 184) at 23.
149. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 7(5), 11, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 9, 10-11.
150. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 7(5), 28, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 9, 17.
151. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 15(1), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 12.
152. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 16(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 12. Conditions of the
authorization must be satisfied.
153. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 16(1), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 12.
154. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 17, 2003 Oj. (L 268) at 12-13.
155. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (9), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2.
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Commission. 156 In light of the EFSA opinion, the Commission submits a draft decision on the application to the Standing Committee on
the Food Chain and Animal Health. 157 As with GM food, the interagency regulatory procedure is used to reach a final decision on the
application. A GM feed authorization is valid throughout the Community for ten years and is renewable, and authorized GM feeds are
included in the Community Register of Genetically Modified Food
58
and Feed.'
D.

Traceability and Labeling - Regulation 1830/2003 and
Regulation 1829/2003

Both traceability and labeling are important components of food
safety measures in the E.C. Two regulations enacted in 2003 work
together to harmonize these requirements.
1.

Traceability and Labeling in Other Measures

The 2002 Food Law defines "traceability" as "the ability to trace
and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance intended
to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all
stages of production, processing and distribution."' 5 9 The Food Law
points out the need for a comprehensive system of traceability within
food and feed businesses to avoid disruption in case of food safety
problems. 160 That Law requires traceability of food, feed, food-producing animals and other substances used in food; it requires food
and feed business operators to implement systems and procedures,
16 1
including labeling, for traceability.
156. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 18(3), (6)-(7), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 14.
157. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 19, 35, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 14-15, 19.
158. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 19(5), 28, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 15, 17.
159. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 3(15), 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, 8.
Compare a narrower definition preferred by U.S. producers and firms: "The efficient
and rapid tracking of physical product and traits from and to critical points of origin
or destination in the food chain necessary to achieve specific food safety and, or,
assurance goals." FARM FOUNDATION, FooD TRACEABILITY & ASSURANCE IN THE GLOBAL
FOOD SYSTEM 9 (2004), www.farmfoundation.org (last visited June 8, 2005).
160. Regulation 178/2002, pmbl. (28), 2002 O.J. (L 31) at 3. The European Rapid
Alert System for Food and Feed, authorized by the Food Law, arts. 50-54, was used in
November 2004 to trace dioxin-contaminated potato by-products used for animal
feed and to block movement of animals on farms that used the feed. Press Release,
European Commission, Dioxin Contamination: EU traceability and alert notification
systems work well (IP/04/1343, Nov. 5, 2004).
161. Regulation 178/2002, art. 18, 2002 OJ. (L 31) at 11. New guidelines facilitate
implementation of traceability requirements in the Food Law. European Commission, Guidance on the Implementation of Articles 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of
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For GMOs specifically, Directive 2001/18 indicates the importance of ensuring traceability "at all stages of the placing on the market of GMOs as or in products authorized under [the placing on the
market provisions] of this Directive." 162 Directive 2001/18 also requires labeling. For placing a GMO on the market, both the initial
notification procedure and the written consent provisions require
compliance with labeling requirements and language that "this product contains genetically modified organisms." 163 Member States are
directed to follow labeling requirements, and minimum thresholds
164
for labeling must be established.
While Directive 2001/18 called for a general pre-market traceability system for GMOs, it did not define traceability, articulate its
objectives, or prescribe an approach for its implementation. Moreover, labeling provisions in Directive 2001/18 did not apply to opera165
tors who placed their GMO products on the open market.
2.

Traceability Measures
a.

Regulation 1830/2003

Regulation 1830/2003, which builds on Directive 2001/18, defines "traceability" as "the ability to trace GMOs and products produced from GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market through
the production and distribution chains. '166 Regulation 1830/2003 establishes a unified system of traceability for GMOs and for food and
feed products produced from GMOs. It builds a harmonized framework, with the objectives of "facilitating accurate labelling, monitoring
the effects on the environment and, where appropriate, on health,
and the implementation of the appropriate risk management meaRegulation (EC) No. 178/2002 on General Food Law (Dec. 2004), http://europa.eu.
int/comm/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/index-en.htm.
162. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (42), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 3.
163. Directive 2001/18, arts. 13(2)(f), 19(3)(e), Annex IV, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 9,
12, 32.
164. Directive 2001/18, art. 21, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13.
165. See Caoimhin MacMaoldin, The New Genetically Modified Food Labelling Requirements: Finally a Lasting Solution, 28 EUR. L. REV. 865, 874 (2003); Francescon, supra
note 56, at 315.
166. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, art. 3(3), 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24,
25. This definition differs slightly from the Food Law, which defines traceability as
"the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance intended to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of production,
processing and distribution." Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 15,
2002 OJ. (L 31) 1, 8.
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sures including, if necessary, withdrawal of products."'1 67 The Regulation applies "at all stages of the placing on the market" to products
placed on the market under E.C. legislation. These include products
consisting of or containing GMOs, food produced from GMOs, and
168
feed produced from GMOs.
(1)

Products Consisting of or Containing GMOs

An "operator" is one who places a product on the market or receives a product placed on the market. 169 Operators must ensure that
prescribed information is transmitted in writing, at the first stage of
placing on the market and at all subsequent stages. Two types of information are required: a statement that the product contains or consists of GMOs, and the unique identifier(s) assigned to the GMOs,
under a system developed by the Commission.1 70 Operators must
have systems and standardized procedures to preserve this information and the identity of the operators by whom and to whom the products were made available for five years from each transaction.
Pre-packaged products must have language on a label (e.g., "This
product contains genetically modified organisms."). The display of
bulk products offered to the final consumer must include similar
language. 171
(2)

Food and Feed Produced from GMOs

Requirements are less stringent for food and feed produced from
GMOs. When placing the product on the market, the operator must
indicate in writing each food ingredient produced from GMOs and
each feed material or additive produced from GMOs; if no list of ingredients exists, the operator must indicate that the product is pro1 72
duced from GMOs. The same five-year retention period applies.
b.

Unique Identifiers

Before most provisions of Regulation 1830/29 could take effect,
the Commission had to establish a system to develop and assign
167. Regulation 1830/2003,
168. Regulation 1830/2003,
169. Regulation 1830/2003,
170. Regulation 1830/2003,
companying notes 172-78.
171. Regulation 1830/2003,
172. Regulation 1830/2003,

art. 1, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 25.
art. 2(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 25.
art. 3(5), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 25.
art. 4A(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 26. See infra text acart. 4B(6)(b), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26.
art. 5(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 24, 27.
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unique identifiers to GMOs. That system was described in Commission Regulation 65/2004 in January 2004.173
Under Regulation 65/2004, all GMOs placed on the market are
to have a unique identifier, which is to be registered with the Commission and with the Biosafety Clearing-House established in connection
with the Cartagena Protocol. 174 The applicant for new GMOs is to
develop the unique identifier, and the consent or authorization of the
GMO will specify the identifier. Consent holders for GMOs authorized before January 2004 must develop identifiers, unless they already
exist.
The annex to the Regulation specifies the formats for unique
identifiers, which are to be coordinated with the OECD BioTrack
product database. 175 Each identifier will have nine alphanumeric digits, divided into three components separated by hyphens. The first
component, two or three digits, identifies the applicant or consent
holder. The second, five or six digits, represents the transformation
event; a unique number should apply to similar transformation events
developed by different organizations or in different organisms. The
final component, a single verification digit, is calculated from the nu176
merical values of the other digits.
Member States must ensure compliance through control measures, including sample checks and testing (following technical guidelines established by the Commission). 1 77 The Commission must
provide a central register with information about GMOs authorized in
1 78
the European Union and, where available, other GMOs.
3.

Labeling

Regulation 1830/2003 imposes labeling requirements for products consisting of or containing GMOs, but is specifically for food or
173. See generally Commission Regulation 65/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 10) 5.
174. Regulation 65/2004, arts. 2-3, 2004 (L 10) at 5-6. For more information, see
Biosafety Clearing-House, Welcome to the Central Portal, http://bch.biodiv.org/.
175. Regulation 65/2004, Annex, 2004 OJ. (L 10) at 8-10; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Biotech Database, http://webdominol.oecd.
org/ehs/bioprod.nsf. The Cartagena Protocol is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 243-59.
176. Regulation 65/2004, Annex, 2004 OJ. (L 10) at 8-10.
177. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 9(1)-(2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 27. Guidelines for
sampling and detection of GM material are in Commission Recommendation 2004/
787, 2004 OJ. (L 348) 18.
178. See Commission Decision 2004/204, art. 3, 2004 OJ. (L 65) 20, 21 (enacted
under Directive 2001/18, art. 31(2), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 15).
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feed produced from GMOs. 179 For products consisting of or containing GMOs, operators must use the words "This product contains genetically modified organisms" or "This product contains genetically
modified [name of the organism(s)]." For pre-packaged products,
the words must appear on the label; for non-pre-packaged products,
on or in connection with the product display. Labeling applies at all
stages of placing on the market. Specific requirements in other E.C.
1 80
legislation continue to apply.
Regulation 1829/2003 has similar labeling requirements for GM
foods and feeds.' 8 ' The food labeling provisions apply to foods to be
delivered to the final consumer or mass caterers in the Community
that either contain or consist of GMOs or are produced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs. Regulation 1829/2003 is
more detailed than Regulation 1830/2003 about the content of the
label. For example, if food consists of more than one ingredient, the
words "genetically modified" shall appear in parentheses following the
ingredient concerned. Moreover, if the ingredient is designated by
category, the words "contains genetically modified [name of organism]" shall appear in the list of ingredients. Further, if there is no list
of ingredients, "genetically modified" shall appear clearly on the label.
Labels must mention characteristics or properties of the food if the
food is different from its conventional counterpart in composition,
nutritional value or effects, intended use, or health implications, or if
the food may raise ethical or religious concerns. 8 2 Detailed rules for
implementation may be adopted.
Labeling rules for feed are similar, though not identical. GMOs
for feed use and feed containing or consisting of GMOs must indicate
"genetically modified [name of organism]" in parenthesis following
the name of the feed. Feed produced from GMOs will instead indicate "produced from genetically modified [name of organism]. '' 185
The Regulation does not require labeling of products produced with
84
GMOs or products from animals fed with GM feed.'

179. Regulation 1830/2003, arts. 4B, 5, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 24, 26-27.
180. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4A(5), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 26. For an example of
requirements that continue to apply see Directive 2000/13, as amended by Commission Directive 2001/101, 2001 OJ. (L 310) 19.
181. Council Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12-14, 24-26, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11-12,

16-17.
182. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 13(2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11-12.
183. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 25(2)(b), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 17.
184. For criticism of this regulatory omission, see MacMaoldin, supra note 165.
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Labeling and Traceability Thresholds

Products that contain "adventitious or technically unavoidable"
traces of authorized GMOs may not have to be labeled, and some traceability requirements do not apply. To prove that the presence of GM
material is adventitious or technically avoidable, operators must be
able to supply evidence that they have taken appropriate steps to
avoid the presence of GM material.18 5 For thresholds, Regulation
1830/2003 refers to Directive 2001/18 and Regulation 1829/2003.
Under Regulation 1830/2003, "traces of GMOs in products" do
not trigger traceability and labeling requirements if the traces do not
exceed the threshold set in Directive 2001/18.186 That Directive indicates that, for products intended for direct processing, labeling is not
required for adventitious or technically unavoidable traces of authorized GMOs of no more than 0.9%. Lower thresholds can be
1 87
established.
For traces of GMOs in "products intended for direct use as food,
feed or for processing,"' the traceability and labeling threshold is in
Regulation 1829/2003. That Regulation, like Directive 2001/18, sets
a threshold of 0.9% of food ingredients considered individually or
food consisting of a single ingredient and 0.9% of feed and each feed
ingredient.189
Regulation 1829/2003 applies a three-year transitional threshold
for some unauthorizedGM material, if authorization is pending. If the
risk evaluation for a GMO is favorable and the authorization application has not been rejected, the adventitious or technically unavoidable
presence of no more than 0.5% of that GM material will not breach
the Regulation. 90 The Commission is to provide a list of GMs that
have received a favorable opinion from the Scientific Committee.' 9 '
This transitional exemption, which lasts until 2007, also applies to the
traceability requirements for products for food and feed produced
from GMOs. 192 In addition, Directive 2001/18 applies this transi185. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12(3), 24(3), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11, 17.
186. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4C(7), 2003 OJ. (L 268)
24, 26; see also Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1.
187. See Directive 2001/18, art. 21(3), 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1, as amended by Regulation 1830/2003, art. 7, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24, 27.
188. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4C(8), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 26.
189. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12(2), 24(2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11, 16.
190. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 47(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 22.
191. Commission Regulation 641/2004, art. 18(1), 2004 OJ. (L 102) 14, 19.
192. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 5(4), 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24, 27.
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tional threshold to GMOs in products intended for direct use as food
193
or feed or for processing.
A threshold for authorized GM seeds, required by Directive
2001/18,194 has not yet been established. Proposed thresholds were
0.3% for cross-pollinating crops (maize, oilseed rape) and 0.5% for
self-pollinating species, calculated to allow harvested material to meet
the 0.9% threshold for direct use or direct processing. 195 This pro196
posed measure remains controversial.
III.

SOME OTHER ISSUES

New regulatory measures in the E.C., especially traceability and
labeling requirements, raise several issues. Now that the moratorium
on GM crops has ended, with GM varieties added to the Common
Catalogue of Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species, producers may
plant GM crops in close proximity to traditional or organic crops.
Production of GM crops may lead to cross-pollination through pollen
drift or commingling of GM and traditional seeds. This situation
raises the difficult issue of coexistence and the related question of liability for cross-pollination and other possible damage. Moreover, the
transboundary movement of living GM materials is the subject of international agreement and E.C. regulation. E.C. requirements for
traceability and labeling, which affect imports as well as E.U.-grown
crops, raise questions under international trade regimes. The following materials focus briefly on these important issues.
A.
1.

Coexistence

Background

Coexistence "refers to the ability of farmers to make a practical
choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop production, in
compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or purity standards. ' ' 197 The issue of coexistence "concerns the economic conse193. Directive 2001/18, art. 12a, as amended by Regulation 1829/2003, art. 43,
2003 OJ. (L 268) at 20-21.
194. Directive 2001/18, art. 21(2), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 13.
195. See Draft Commission Decision, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
196. The Danish and Austrian delegations were calling for detection levels of 0.1
percent (the detection level for genetically modified seeds). Press Release, European
Council, 2578th Council Meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries (IP/8350/04, Apr. 26,
2004).
197. Commission Recommendation 2003/556 on guidelines for the development
of national strategies and best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming, 2003 OJ. (L 189) 36.

JOURNAL OF FOOD

LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 1:43

quences of adventitious presence" of GM crops in non-GM crops,
which can result from "seed impurities, cross-pollination, volunteers
198
.... harvesting-storage practices and transport."

As Franz Fischler (then agricultural commissioner) indicated,
"[c] o-existence is about economic and legal questions, not about risks
or food safety, because only authorised GMOs can be cultivated in the
E.U." 199 Issues raised by coexistence are economic aspects of adventitious presence of GMOs (e.g., labeling and the resultant loss of income from conventional crops; contamination of organic crops,
which cannot be produced from GMOs under E.C. law) and management measures required to avoid adventitious presence. The
probability of "admixture" of GM and non-GM crops and the measures for avoiding it depend on the type of crop and on geographic
200
factors like natural conditions and field sizes.
Some Member States want to ban GM crops in part or all of their
territories, but Mr. Fischler concluded that mandatory GMO-free
zones must be excluded. The protection of mere economic interests
by strong limits on fundamental liberties cannot be justified legally,
and the approach "runs counter to the very principle of coexistence."

201

As amended in 2003, Directive 2001/18 notes that "Member
States may take appropriate measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in other products." The Directive directs the Commission to study the issue and then "develop guidelines on the
coexistence of genetically modified, conventional and organic
20 2
crops."

198. Communication from Mr. Fischler to the Commission, Co-existence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops (Feb. 25, 2003), http://www.zs-l.de/
gmo/downloads/Communication.Fischler_02_2003.pdf
[hereinafter Communication].
199. Press Release, European Commission, GMOs: Commission addresses GM crop
co-existence (IP/03/314, Mar. 5, 2003).

200. Communication, supra note 198, at 2-5. A practical example of the issue was
raised in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Watson, 1998
E.W.C.A. Civ. 1250 (July 21, 1998), http://bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/

1250.html. Watson, a major organic grower in Britain, feared cross-pollination between his crop and GM trial plantings on a neighboring farm. The court refused to
order destruction or detasseling of the GM plants because risk of cross-pollination was
slight and the GM producer had the appropriate consent for trial planting. Id.
201. Communication, supra note 198, at 6.
202. Directive 2001/18, art. 26, as amended by Regulation 1829/2003, art. 43, 2003
O.J. (L268) 1, 21.
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Commission Recommendation

The Commission issued guidelines in its July 2003 Recommendation. The Commission agreed with Mr. Fischler that "[n]o form of
agriculture, be it conventional, organic, or agriculture using [GMOs]
should be excluded in the European Union." 20 3 Farmers should be
allowed to choose the type of crops they grow, but consumer choice
2 04
should be protected, too.

Because coexistence measures necessary to protect health and
the environment are required when GMOs are authorized under Directive 2001/18, economic loss and management measures are of
most concern. Member States, which are diverse, should develop
their own measures for coexistence, with guidance from the
20 5
Commission.
The Commission guidelines, which are nonbinding recommendations to Member States, address commercial seed and crop production. The guidelines are not measures to be adopted, but instead
general principles to apply and factors to consider in designing Statespecific measures. Principles include transparency, stakeholder involvement, science-based decision making, a system built on existing
means of crop segregation, focus on authorized GM varieties, and
consideration of liability rules. 20 6 Factors focus on more practical concerns like sources of admixture, threshold values for labels, and characteristics of specific crops. 20 7 The Commission also provided an
"indicative catalogue" of measure, including on-farm measures, that
might be part of a Member State's coexistence strategy. 20 8
Though the Commission rejected the idea of mandatory prohibitions of GM crops, the guidelines indicated that voluntary cooperation of farmers would be appropriate. Farmers could agree to
establish zones of a single production type, which would reduce costs
of crop segregation. Alternatively, producers could cluster fields with
similar crop varieties, plant varieties with different flowering times,
20 9
use different sowing dates, or coordinate crop rotations.
Directive 2001/18 and the Commission Recommendation anticipate that each Member State will enact measures to address coexis203.
204.
205.
206.

Commission Recommendation 2003/556, pmbl. (1), 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 36.
Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 1.1, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 39.
Recommendation 2003/556, pmbl. (4)-(8), 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 36.
Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.1, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 40-42. Twelve

principles are listed.
207.
208.
209.

Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.2, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 42-44.
Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 3, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 44-47.
Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 3.3, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 46.
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tence for its own agricultural conditions. So far, few States have done
so. One exception is Denmark, which enacted its Act on the Growing
etc. of Genetically Modified Crops (the Act on co-existence) in June
2004.210 That law authorizes the Minister for Food, Agriculture and
Fisheries to make rules to manage the coexistence of GM and other
crops. 21 1 Rules may require a license for growing, handling and transport of GM crops, issue restrictive authorizations for growing GM
crops, and limit sales of GM materials to authorized growers.2 1 2 The
Minister may impose other obligations, including notification of
nearby owners and producers of GM crops, prescribed separation distances, and reports on field locations.2 1 3 The Minister also has authority to pay compensation, within limits, to farmers who suffer losses
from unintended GM material in crops, with funds collected through
an annual fee per hectare of GM crops.2 1 4 Germany's new Genetic
Modification Act, passed by the Bundestag 26 November 2004,
prescribes coexistence measures. These include a site register accessible to the public and a requirement that those who use GM products
take precautionary action (including good farming practices) to avoid
adverse effects. Farmers who cultivate GM crops may be liable for material adverse effects, including admixture.21 5 Italy has also enacted a
coexistence law, which authorizes framework regulations for coexistence and directs regions to adopt coexistence plans with technical
216
rules.
B.
1.

Liability

Preliminary Considerations

The assignment of liability for damages that might arise from development or use of GMOs raises difficult issues. Measures enacted to
govern GMOs and their products do not address liability comprehensively, and more general measures apply only in limited circumstances.
210. Act No. 436 of 9 June 2004, available at http://www.fvm.dk/file/co-extinse.pdf.
211. Act No. 436 §§ 3-8.
212. Act No. 436 §§ 3-6.
213. Act No. 436 § 6.
214. Act No. 436 §§ 9-12.
215. Gentechnikgesetz (GenTG), art. 1, §§ 16a, 16b, 36a (Bundestag, 26 Nov.
2004).
216. Decreto-Legge 22 novembre 2004, n.279, Gazzetta Ufficiale, serie generale, n.
280; Legge 28 gennaio 2005, n.5, Gazzetta Ufficiale, serie generale, n.22. An English
translation is available in USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Gain Report No.
IT5003.
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Directive 2001/18 governing deliberate release of GMOs did not
address liability. Its preamble indicates that the Directive is without
prejudice to national legislation on environmental liability. E.C. regulation of GMOs should be complemented by measures that assign liability for environmental damage, which would be enacted in a more
general liability scheme expected to apply to GMOs and other danger2 17
ous activities.
The Commission Recommendation on coexistence recognizes
that liability for GM crops is an issue for Member States.
The type of instruments adopted may have an impact on the application of national liability rules in the event of economic damage
resulting from admixture. Member States are advised to examine
their civil liability laws to find out whether the existing national laws
offer sufficient and equal possibilities in this regard. Farmers, seed
suppliers and other operators should be fully informed about the
liability criteria that apply in their country in the case of damage
2 18
caused by admixture.
The Recommendation suggested that an existing or new insurance
scheme might help to compensate damage from admixture of GM
2 19
and other crops.
The E.C. Products Liability Directive, which applies broadly,
prescribes that "The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a
defect in his product."220 A product is defective when "it does not
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account." 221 To help restore consumer confidence in
safety of agricultural products, the directive was amended in 1999 to
include primary agricultural products. So in some instances, limited
by the Directive's definition of damage and the requirement that the
product be defective (questionable for GMOs), measures enacted
under the Products Liability Directive might be available to redress
222
damage from GMOs.
217. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (16), 2001 O.J. (C 304) at 2.
218. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.1.9, 2003 O.J. (L 189) at
42.
219. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.1.0, 2003 O.J. (L 189) at 42.
220. Council Directive 85/374, art. 1, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, as amended by Parliament and Council Directive 1999/34, 1999 O.J. (L 141) 20.
221. Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31.
222. Directive 85/374, art. 9, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31; Margaret Rosso Grossman,
Genetically modified crops in the United States: Federal regulation and state tort liability, 5
ENVTL. L. REv. 86, 97 (2003). For more information on this Directive and its limited
application to GMOs, see BERGxAmP, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 45, at
252-58.
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Some argue that no special liability regime for GMOs is justified
because regulation has reduced risk to "acceptable levels," and both
"scientific knowledge and practical experience" indicate that no significant, unreasonable risk remains. 223 Even when policy makers
agree that a liability scheme might be desired, the design of such a
scheme fosters disagreement. For example, negotiations prior to enactment of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol considered numerous alternative liability regimes for biotechnology, but no agreement could
be reached. Instead, the Protocol calls for further study.2 2 4 Nor do
other liability regimes (e.g., the Council of Europe's Lugano Convention) impose liability on agricultural producers. Some national liability regimes provide remedies through laws imposing strict liability for
defective goods or substances or through fault-based principles of
negligence or nuisance. 225 Specifically for GMOs, the new German
Genetic Engineering Act imposes liability on producers whose crops
cause a material adverse effect on other property owners, 226 whereas
2 27
the Danish coexistence law authorizes a compensation system.
2.

Environmental Liability Directive-Directive 2004/35

The Commission's White Paperon EnvironmentalLiability228 reflects
the concerns of the European public about environmental damage
from deliberate release of GMOs. The White Paperrecommended that
liability from GMOs-including both damage to biodiversity and damage to persons and property-be treated in a horizontal measure that
would provide a general framework for liability in a number of
sectors.
That horizontal measure is Directive 2004/35 on environmental
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, enacted in April 2004.229 Invoking the polluter pays prin-

ciple and the principle of sustainable development, 230 the Directive
223. See Lucas Bergkamp, Allocating unknown risk: Liabilityfor EnvironmentalDamages
Caused by Deliberately Released Genetically Modified Organisms, 2000 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
MILIEUAANSPRAKELIJKHEID (Part I) 61, (Part II) 104, 110.
224. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Montreal 2000), art. 27, 39 I.L.M. 1039; Bergkamp, supra note 223, Part I, at 66-67.

225. See Bergkamp, supra note 218, Part I, at 68-70, Part II, at 104-107. This section
was adapted from Grossman, supra note 222, at 97.
226. Gentechnikgesetz, supra note 215, § 36a.
227. Act on the Growing etc. of Genetically Modified Crops, supra note 210.
228. COM(2000)66 final.
229. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 oJ. (L 143) 56.
230. Directive 2004/35, art. 1, 2004 OJ. (L 143) at 59; see also EC TREArY art.
174(2).
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on environmental liability governs only environmental damage, rather
than traditional damage to persons and property.23 1
Environmental damage under the Directive includes damage to
protected species and natural habitats (generally those protected by
the Wild Birds23 2 and Habitats Directives 233 or by national nature con-

servation legislation). It also includes water damage and land damage. 2 34 The latter is contamination that creates "a significant risk of

human health being adversely affected as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, on or under land, of substances, preparations,
organisms, or micro-organisms."23 5 The Directive does not give private parties a right to compensation from environmental damage,
236
though it does not prevent Member States from doing so.

Member States implement the Directive through a competent authority, and by 30 April 2007 must have national measures to comply
with the Directive. The Directive is not retroactive and does not apply
to damage caused before that date. 23 7 Member State measures must

require operators (those who carry out the listed activity or hold the
authorization for the activity) to take preventive action to avoid environmental damage, to apply measures to remediate the damage, and
238
to bear the costs for preventive and remedial actions.
GMOs are one focus of the Directive, which applies to environmental damage, and imminent threat of damage, caused by activities
listed in Annex 111.239 Among the listed activities are contained use of

GM micro-organisms, as defined by Directive 90/219, and deliberate
release and marketing of GMOs, as defined by Directive 2001/18.240

Thus operators have the duty to prevent damage and to remediate
damage from GMOs. But Member States may allow the operator not
to bear the cost of remedial actions under some conditions-if the
operator was not at fault or negligent and the damage was caused by
an emission or event expressly authorized and in compliance with national measures that implement E.C. measures (for GMOs, Directives
90/219 and 2001/18) or by an emission or activity that the operator
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Directive 2004/35, pmbl. (14), art 3, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 57, 60-61.
Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1, as amended.
Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7, as amended.
Directive 2004/35, art. 2(1), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 59.
Directive 2004/35, art. 2(1)(c), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 59.
Directive 2004/35, art. 3(3), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 60-61.
Directive 2004/35, arts. 17, 19(1), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 64-65.
Directive 2004/35, arts. 2(6), 6-8, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 60, 61-63.
Directive 2004/35, art. 3(1), Annex III, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 60, 70.

240. Council Directive 90/219, Annex I, as amended by Council Directive 98/81,
1998 O.J. (L 330) 13, 19; Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, Annex III, 2001
O.J. (L 106) at 23.
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can show was not considered likely to cause environmental damage
"according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge" when
the emission or activity took place. 241 This exemption would seem to
apply to GMOs that are authorized and used in accordance with their
authorizations.
Member States can maintain or adopt more stringent measures to
prevent and remedy environmental damage and can identify additional activities and responsible parties. 242 Because of the intentionally limited scope of the Directive, Member State legislation will apply
to redress traditional damage to persons and property.
C.

TransboundaryMovement of GMOs-Directive 1946/2003

International law has influenced E.C. measures that govern GM
crops, especially labeling for transboundary movement. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver243
adopts a precautionary approach to the "transfer, handling and
sity
use of living modified organisms [LMOs] resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to
human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary
'244
movements.
The Protocol establishes an "advance informed agreement procedure" to govern the first intentional movement of LMOs for inten245
tional introduction into the environment of an importing country.
In brief, the procedure involves notice by the Party of export, acknowledgement by the Party of import, opportunity for a risk assessment, and a decision, in writing, from the Party of import that
approves or prohibits the proposed import. The Protocol requires labeling of LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing, for contained use, or for intentional introduction into the
environment. 246 The Protocol on Biosafety does not establish liability.
Instead it provides for adoption of a process for elaboration of international rules governing liability and redress for damage from trans247
boundary movements of LMOs.

241. Directive 2004/35, art. 8(4), 2004 OJ. (L 143) at 62-63.
242. Directive 2004/35, art. 16, 2004 OJ. (L 143) at 64.
243. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Montreal 2000), 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf.
244. Id. art. 1, at 1027.
245. Id. arts. 7-13, at 1030-33.
246. Id. art. 18(2), at 1035.
247. Id. art. 27, at 1039.
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The Protocol creates the Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate exchange of information and other activities. 248 In 2004, the Conference of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol enacted a Decision that
outlines identity requirements for transboundary shipment for LMOs
and recommends use of the OECD BioTrack unique identifiers. A
technical experts group will develop more detailed guidelines. 249
The European Community and its Member States are parties to
the Protocol. Directive 2001/18 refers to the Cartagena Protocol and
the E.C.'s obligations. 2 50 The Directive invited a Commission proposal with measures to implement the procedures for advance informed
agreement and other requirements of the Cartagena Protocol. In addition, Regulation 1829/2003 requires notification of authorizations
and other actions concerning GMOs to the Biosafety Clearing-House
251
and other cooperation with the Protocol.
To comply with the Protocol, the E.C. enacted Regulation 1946/
2003 on transboundary movements of GMOs. 252 That Regulation
takes account of the precautionary principle and supplements, but
does not interfere with, already-existing E.C. measures, for example,
the provisions of Directive 2001/18. The Protocol requires the identification of GMOs exported from or imported into the Community.
Because E.C. measures already govern traceability, labeling, and identification of E.C. products and imports, the heart of Regulation 1946/
2003 enacts similar rules for exports. 253 Exporters are required to ensure accurate, written notification to the party of import and may not
export without express written consent from the importing country. 2 5 4 No notice is required for contained use. GMOs intended for
direct use as food or feed or for processing need no notice and consent for import, but Member States must notify the BioSafety Clearing255
House of relevant GM authorizations.
When GMOs are exported, documentation must indicate that the
product contains or consists of GMOs and provide the unique identifi248. Id. art. 20, at 1036-37.
249.

Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the

Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Biosafety, Apr. 14, 2004, BS-I/6, 85, http://

www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/bs/mop-01/official/mop-01-15-en.pdf.
250. Parliament
106) at 1-2, 16.
251. Parliament
21. The Biosafety
supra note 174.
252. Parliament
253. Regulation
254. Regulation
255. Regulation

and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (13), art. 32, 2001 OJ. (L
and Council Regulation 1829/2003, art. 44, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at
Clearing-House plays a role in the system of unique identifiers; see
and Council Regulation 1946/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 287) 1.
1946/2003, pmbl. (16), arts. 4-13, 2003 OJ. (L 287) at 4-6.
1946/2003, arts. 4-5, 2003 OJ. (L 287) at 4.
1946/2003, arts. 8(1), 9, 2003 O.J. (L 287) at 5.
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cation codes for those GMOs. Food or feed products must indicate
that the GMOs are intended for food, feed, or processing and not for
deliberate release into the environment. GMOs exported for deliberate release must include additional information about traits and
256
characteristics.
Critics have argued that the provisions of the Biosafety Protocol
were "never intended to apply to food products but are in fact the
basis for the entire E.U. [regulatory] revision process. '2 57 Indeed, intentional introduction into the environment, for purposes of the advance informed agreement procedure, does not include LMOs
intended for direct use as food, feed, or for processing, though parties
to the Protocol must receive notice of approval of those products
through the BioSafety Clearing-House. 258 The Protocol also requires
documentation that LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed
"may contain" LMOs and are not intended for intentional introduc259
tion into the environment.
D.

WTO

E.C. regulation of GMOs affects trading partners, including the
United States. 260 E.C. measures that govern GMOs apply within the
E.C., but those measures also apply to imports. Thus the defacto moratorium on authorization of GMOs under Directive 2001/18 had a significant effect on US trade. E.C. measures enacted in 2003 to require
traceability and labeling will impose significant burdens on US
exporters.
This article has focused only on E.C. regulation of GM crops,
food, and feed, but many nations have enacted laws and regulations to
govern GMOs. Moreover, international institutions also govern biotechnology for various purposes (e.g., health, trade, environment).
Researchers have identified seven international organizations involved
with biotechnology (most beyond the scope of this article).261 Among
international measures are the Biosafety Protocol with its advance informed agreement procedure, international food standards of the Co256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Regulation 1946/2003, art. 12, 2003 O.J. (L 287) at 6.
Mansour & Key, supra note 1, at 66.
Cartagena Protocol, arts. 7, 11, 39 I.L.M. at 1027, 1030, 1032.
Id. art. 18, at 1035.
See generally PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: AN ExAMINATION OF THE TRADE ISSUES SURROUNDING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD (Aug.

2003), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/issuebriefs/europe.pdf.
261. Donald E. Buckingham & Peter W.B. Phillips, Issues and Optionsfor the Multilateral Regulation of GM Foods, 2 EsTEY CENTREJ.
(2001).
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dex Alimentarius Commission, and agreements of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Most trade disputes focused on GM issues will be directed to the
WTO dispute settlement procedure. The WTO relies on scientific
knowledge developed by other organizations and is likely to "deliver
pro-trade, science- and rules-based decisions," albeit limited to the
262
cases brought to the dispute resolution body.
1.

Current Dispute and the SPS Agreement

In response to the E.C.'s long moratorium on authorization of
GM products and to individual Member State bans of GM products,
the United States, joined by Argentina and Canada, invoked the WTO
dispute settlement system. In May 2003, the United States filed a consultation request, and in August 2003 requested establishment of a
263
dispute settlement panel.
The United States alleged that the long E.C. moratorium violates
numerous obligations under the WTO, including the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement applies to measures designed to protect
life and health that also affect international trade. The Agreement
indicates that Members must ensure that "any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,

animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence." 26 4 Among
other alleged violations, the United States noted that the E.C. had

failed to use the types of scientific risk assessment required by the SPS

265
Agreement and failed to base its moratorium on risk assessment.

Moreover, though the establishment of procedures for approval of biotech products does not violate the SPS agreement, the United States
argued that the E.C. moratorium violates the requirement that those
26 6
procedures must be completed "without undue delay."

262. Id. at 185, 187. The WTO Agreements do not apply neatly to issues concerning
biotechnology. See Arthur E. Appleton, The Labeling of GMO ProductsPursuantto International Trade Rules, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 566, 570-78 (2000).
263. Case WT/DS291; see also US, Executive Summary of the First Submission of the
United States, WT/DS291, 292, 293, 30 April 2004.
264. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 2.2,
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
265. Id. art. 5.
266. Id. art. 8; Annex C, 1 (a). But see Aaron A. Ostrovsky, The European Commission's Regulationsfor Genetically Modified Organismsand the Current WTO Dispute-Human
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The United States also objects to Member State restrictions on
authorized GMOs. Six Member States (Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) have enacted marketing (five States)
or import (Greece) bans on approved GM products, using safeguard
provisions under E.C. legislation. 267 The safeguard provisions require
evidence that the product is a risk to human health or the environment. The E.C. Scientific Committee found no scientific basis for the
bans, but the State bans have continued. Therefore, the United States
alleges, the measures are not based on risk assessment and also violate
268
the SPS Agreement.
The dispute settlement panel assigned to the case has agreed to
seek expert scientific testimony before deciding the dispute. A panel
report is expected sometime in 2005.
2.

Other WTO Issues

E.C. reluctance to authorize and import GMOs and their products raises other trade issues. Under the GATT, the national treatment rule requires that products imported from WTO members "be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements .
-269 One relevant question under this provision is whether
GM and conventional crops are "like products."2 70 If they are not, the
national treatment rule does not apply. If they are like products,
GATT article XX provides general exceptions for measures "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health." 27 1 The SPS agreeHealth or EnvironmentalMeasures? Why the Deliberate Release Directive is More Appropriately
Adjudicated in the WTO Under the TBT Agreement, 15 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
209 (2004).
267. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
268. SPS Agreement, arts. 2.2, 5.1, and Annex A, 4. For more information on the
SPS Agreement, see Chris Hilson & Duncan French, Regulating GM Products in the EU:
Risk, Precaution and International Trade, in AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
LAW, POLICY, AND THE WTO 215, 228-31 (Michael N. Cardwell et al. eds., 2003).
269. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 1947, art. 11. 4, http://
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT].
270. SeeJulian Wong, Note, Are Biotech Crops and Conventional Crops Like Products?An
Analysis under GATT, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 27 (2003).
271. See GATT art. XX, chapeau & (b):
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
....
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
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ment, with its risk assessment, may provide the standard for determin272
ing whether measures are necessary.
The E.C. Regulation that governs traceability and labeling may
give rise to further claims under the WTO, especially because label
requirements apply to imports. 273 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) is intended to ensure that technical
regulations made to fulfill a legitimate objective do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Because labeling is a technical
regulation, E.C. measures must be compatible with the TBT Agreement. Thus, the measures must fulfill a legitimate objective, which
include, e.g., "protection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment. '274 If challenged under the TBT
Agreement, E.C. justifications for labeling (environmental protection,
consumer choice) must be found to be a legitimate objective. The
TBT Agreement also requires non-discriminatory treatment for like
products; discrimination triggers application of GATT Article XX.275
The Cartagena Protocol affects trade through its advance informed consent procedure and required labels for imports of LMOs.
Its provisions may raise questions under the WTO, especially where
Protocol restrictions seem to conflict with WTO goals of free trade.
Differences in approach exist; the Protocol, for example, encourages
adoption of the precautionary approach in the face of scientific uncertainty, 276 while the SPS Agreement allows only a provisional measure,
277
followed by an objective risk assessment within a reasonable time.

Further, some have questioned whether the label requirement ("may
contain LMOs") under the Cartagena Protocol complies with the SPS
or TBT, and whether the E.C. might use its obligations under the Pro278
tocol to support its own measures in a WTO dispute.

272. See Norman W. Thorson, International Trade in Genetically Altered Agricultural
Products: Impact of the Biosafety Protocol, in AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE,

supra note 268, at 239, 257-61.
273. Appleton, supra note 262, at 570.
274. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (GATT Standards
Code), art. 2.2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt-e/tbtagr.htm.
For a detailed description see Ostrovsky, supra note 266, at 225-31.
275. See Hilson & French, supra note 268, at 231-33.
276. Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, arts. 10(6), 11(8), 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf.
277. SPS Agreement, art. 5.7.
278. Hilson & French, supra note 268, at 235.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The major components of the updated E.C. regulatory system for
GM crops, food, and feed are now in effect, and regulators have authorized several new products under these measures. Nonetheless,
Member States are divided about GMOs, and fears about their impact
on health and the environment continue, even after successful risk
assessments. These Member State divisions and fears may help to explain the November 2004 failure of the regulatory committee to approve import of Monsanto's maize, MON 863.279 Moreover, several
Member States continue to ban products already approved by the E.C.
The new regulatory system for GMOs exerts significant influence
beyond the borders of the E.U. and its now-25 Member States. The
E.C. reluctance to approve new products limits trade by preventing
the import of non-approved GMs that have been used without incident in the United States and elsewhere. Even when GM crops, food
and feed have been approved in the E.C., regulatory requirements
impose significant burdens on US food and feed companies, as well as

producers.
Regulation 1830/2003, the labeling and traceability measure, is
particularly burdensome. 28 0 It imposes obligations and additional
costs on agribusiness firms, which must ensure segregation of GM and
traditional crops in the complex grain-handling system. Though
some firms already have systems for traceability, others must develop
and implement them. The Regulation affects United States farmers as
well. Some will choose to plant only traditional crops for export;
those who grow GM varieties segregate GM from other crops. Production practices that minimize pollen drift and other causes of admixture are important for both traditional and GM varieties. The low
threshold for labeling products with adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of GMOs, with an even lower threshold expected
for seed, makes the avoidance of admixture critical. Moreover,
though labeling facilitates consumer choice, labeling may also stigma279. Press Release, European Commission, Midday Express of 2004-11-29, News
from the Press and Communication Directorate's Midday Briefing (MEX/04/1129,
Nov. 29, 2004). Because the regulatory committee failed to reach a qualified majority,
the authorization proposal will go to the Council of Ministers. If the Council neither
adopts nor rejects the decision, the Commission can adopt the decision to authorize
MON 863.
280. See USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century Agriculture,
Global Traceability and Labeling Requirements for Agricultural Biotechnology-Derived Products: Impacts and Implications for the United States (May 2005), http://
w3.usda.gov/agencies/biotech/ac2l /reports/tlpaperv37final.pdf.

20051

TRACEABILITY AND

LABELING

IN

THE

E.U.

tize GM products and discourage consumption of foods with no
known health risks.281
Different attitudes in United States and the E.U. toward GMOs
on the part of citizens, the agricultural community, and regulatory
agencies help to account for differences in regulatory requirements
for GM crops and their products. The European approach, based on
process and heavily influenced by the precautionary principle, has
limited the market for GM varieties, which are a significant percentage of United States agricultural production. It is to be hoped that
incompatibilities in the U.S. and E.C. regulatory systems can be resolved without further damage to trade and to U.S.-E.U. relations.

281.

See Mansour & Key, supra note 1, at 64-68; Appleton, supra note 262.

